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'DON'T LET THE BASTARACHES GRIND You DOWN'

THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN LEGAL THEORY AND
THE ROLE OF LEGAL THEORISTS IN JUDGING
(OR 'DON'T LET THE BASTARACHES GRIND YOU DOWN')
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*

What is the future of law reviews? And does it matter? These are important questions,
at least to legal academics and the students who run them. Whether the world would be
any worse off if law reviews ceased to exist or, more realistically, if the number of law
reviews was significantly reduced is moot at best. In this regard, the central challenge to
law reviews is provided by the Internet. Its capacity to revolutionize the rarefied culture
of law reviews and legal scholarship is profound and presents opportunities and threats
that many have only begun to imagine or realize. Nevertheless, assuming that law reviews
are likely to be around in considerable numbers for the next little while whether in
electronic form or not (and I leave this issue to others more familiar with the
technological media) I want to concern myself with the substance of what law reviews
publish. In particular, I want to explore briefly the relationship between adjudication and
legal theory as mediated and nurtured by law reviews. However, in the short space
available, I will concentrate on only one, but a seriously important, dimension of this
relationship - I will propose the kind of substantive content which law reviews should
not be including and the kind of audience to which law reviews should not be catering.
So that there is no mistaking my stance, I maintain that law reviews do a disservice to
themselves and the idea of legal scholarship generally when they pander to those judges
and academics who insist that the adjudicative function is at the heart of the legal
enterprise and is the raison d'6tre of legal scholarship.

Let me begin with an example of the kind of scholarship that law reviews should, at
the very best, be leery of and, at the worst, be downright dismissive of. It is a piece by
the Honourable Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache of the Supreme Court of Canada, and,
appropriately, it was published in this journal a couple of years ago. I hold no brief
against Justice Bastarache as either judge or person. But I do take exception, as an
academic, to the thrust of his particular call to arms; the fact that the judge was also a
career academic before his judicial appointment is tartly pertinent. The essay's particular
appeal is that it calls upon legal academics to engage in exactly the scope and substance
of legal scholarship that law reviews should be at pains to avoid. In brief terms,
Bastarache asks legal academics to consider refocusing their intellectual energies so that
they eschew the more abstract and arid endeavours of jurisprudence and offer a more
practical and grounded mode of juristic scholarship - "Academic commentary that is
useful to judges is that which assembles and rationalizesjudicial decisions in a given field
of law, draws out the general principles that these decisions imply, criticizes judicial

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. This comment is based on the paper
presented to the session: "The Role and Future of the Law Review" at the Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Association of Law Teachers, 28 May 2000. The comment is a response in part to a
presentation given by the Honourable Mr. Justice Bastarache, infra note I.
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decisions and suggests different approaches to particular areas of law."' This plea for a
more "useful" style of legal scholarship is a little surprising in that most legal scholarship
is already committed to such a project. However, insofar as Bastarache is setting new
goals for legal academics and mindful of his elevated position in the legal hierarchy, it
is an entreaty that cannot be ignored and must be met with a robust rejection.
Although some maintain that the last twenty years have been "a golden age for ...
legal
scholarship," 2 others have argued strenuously that it has been a lamentable phase in which
practical relevance has been sacrificed to theoretical indulgence. For instance, Judge (and
former law professor) Harry Edwards has chastised academics for their abandonment of
the traditional scholarly virtues of relevance and practicality in favour of the more dubious
qualities of scholasticism and aridity.3 He urges that there ought to be a return to the
traditional role of legal scholarship as a practical and doctrinal critique. While it ought to
be more relevant and less sophisticated, the general aim is for legal academics to act as
helpmates to the courts so that they can develop areas of the law in a technically sound
and substantively fair way; criticism tends to be piecemeal, specific, and constructive. In
his essay, Michel Bastarache adds his own distinctive Canadian voice to this developing
chorus.
Noting that there has been an increased reliance on both legal and non-legal academic
work since the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 twenty
years ago, Bastarache urges a move away from the kind of analytical legal theory that
functions "in terms of abstract, logically coherent, formal conceptual systems" and
"promotes stability and coherent changeability by affecting the substantive content of
rights and by providing a rational basis for judicial decision-making." 5 He laments such
a preoccupation on three grounds. First, he maintains that such a jurisprudential
perspective "presupposes a metaphysically untenable idea of objective moral truth."
Second, he highlights the fact that such theorizing "is impractical in that it does not
sufficiently attend to what works in real life." Third, he contends that legal theory "does
not accurately describe what judges actually do when they reason through cases." 6 By
way of conclusion, he also points out that adjudication is pluralistic in that it concerns

M. Bastarache, "The Role of Academics and Legal Theory in Judicial Decision-Making" (1999) 37
Alta. L. Rev. 739 at 740. This is a publication of an oral address made to the students of the Lav
Faculty, University of Alberta, 20 November 1998.
J.H. Langbein, "Scholarly and Professional Objectives in Legal Education: American Trends and
English Comparisons" in P. Birks, ed., Pressing Problems in the Law: What Are Law Schools For?

vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 6.
See H.T. Edwards, "The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession"
(1992) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, and "The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession: A Postscript" (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2191, and "Another Postscript to The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession" (1994) 69 Wash. L. Rev. 561. For
a survey of tile
ensuing debate, see MJ. Saks et al., "Is There a Growing Gap among Law, Law
Practice and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation
Apart" (1996) 30 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 353.

6

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I I
[hereinafter Charter].
Bastarache, supra note I at 739.
Ibid. at 740.
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itself with more than legal theory and "is guided by a search for the correct balance of
all relevant factors." 7 In order to achieve this more practical and pragmatic approach,
Bastarache recommends the virtues of what he calls "implicit legal theory," which is "that
body of doctrinal legal knowledge that is contained in the pages of treatises and law
review articles and that is the result of academic conferences where the true meaning of
'
concepts and principles that we have long taken for granted are discussed."
This form of legal theory is taken by Bastarache to incorporate a number of different
and equally useful genres. He identifies three main approaches - an explanatory legal
theory which "attempts to describe facts, identify causes for positive phenomenon and
explain how things function"; a more critical and predictive version which "attempts to
determine how a particular area of the law could be improved by means of achieving
certain ideal purposes"; and a more normative kind of legal theory which "seeks to
determine what judges should ultimately value when confronted with particular legal
issues." 9 Utilizing the area of family law as a forcing ground for his ideas and comments,
Bastarache illustrates how such legal scholarship has been invaluable in helping judges by
making sense (i.e., "the act of drawing out implicit legal policy and seeking higher levels
of comprehension and articulation of legal ideas") of a complex and dynamic series of
issues." Although he has reservations about whether academic commentary drove or
simply supported doctrinal developments, he is in no doubt that it is incumbent on judges
to draw upon the vital work of academic jurists. For him, there is no question that the
choice between this theoretical approach and others is a no-brainer - "Should we, as
judges, be cognizant only of the strict legal issue before us and the incremental evolution
of the common law through precedent, or should we be open to new approaches and
commentary by academics who monitor the law in a given area and reconcile it with
broader social and legal issues?"''
There is much to admire in Bastarache's dismissal of analytical jurisprudence with its
precious emphasis on abstraction and its overweening respect for coherence. However,
there is little reason to believe that Bastarache's alternative has more to recommend it.
Indeed, his proffered alternative is more a variant on analytical jurisprudence than an
alternative to it. Apart from drawing on the dubious virtue of "principled consistency,"
Bastarache does much to tout the validity of traditional legal scholarship, suitably lifted
a theoretical notch or two. There is little in Bastarache's essay that reassures the reader
that the move that he counsels is anything more than a shift from black-letter law to
black-letter theory. Moreover, the underlying thrust of Bastarache's whole essay is to
confirm that the benchmark of valid legal scholarship is its capacity to contribute to the
better performance of the judicial task. As he concludes:
In the end, judges decide. Decisions are not legal articles . [There is danger in quoting "unhelpful"
academic materials and thereby suggesting they are more valid because they are adjuncts to the judicial

7
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process. But then again, we must not ignore academic contributions by concluding too rapidly that they
'12
are only "opinions.

After canvassing the present state of legal scholarship, I will connect Bastarache's
comments with the continuing debate in jurisprudential circles and offer a different
account of what might amount to "useful" legal theory.

There is little different in the overall law review content from the situation twenty
years ago - there is simply more of it. Harry Arthurs survey of Canadian academic
research remains almost as valid today as it was twenty years ago. In Law and Learning,
he mapped the intellectual landscape on planet Canadian Law. He discovered a uniform
terrain which, apart from the occasional exotic hot spot, was rather flat and uninspiring;
there was little that was likely to trouble or challenge the traditional explorer. Indeed, the
modem Canadian legal scene offers ample demonstration of the old adageplusqa change,
plus c'est la m~me chose. While there has been a significant increase in the amount of
interdisciplinary work done by legal scholars, the fact is that a great deal of that work has
been harnessed to the traditional academic task of performing "taxonomic" scholarship
(i.e., the classification and organization of legal rules). The performance of this traditional
taskhas become much more sophisticated, but it remains devoted to the same set of goals
and ambitions.' 3 The ability of mainstream scholarship to absorb and neutralize new
insights and fresh perspectives on the study of law is truly staggering. Indeed, its
intellectual agility in doing this is to be admired, although it is a great pity that such a
prodigious talent cannot be put to more rewarding and less toadying effect. In short, there
has been something of a shift from black-letter lawyering, but it has not gone much
further than black-letter theorizing. Much academic work continues to operate within the
cramping and pervasive spirit of a black-letter mentality that encourages scholars and
jurists to maintain legal study as an inward-looking and self-contained discipline. There
is still a marked tendency to treat law as somehow a world of its own that is separate
from the society within which it operates and purports to serve. In a manner of speaking,
the ghosts of Blackstone and Coke not only prowl the corridors of academe, but are
welcome souls in its offices and classrooms.
When it comes to thinking about the adjudicative role, most Canadian academics still
exist in a semi-conscious state in which the illusions of noble dreams and ignoble
nightmares still hold sway.' 4 The overriding problem though is that it is not entirely
clear which is the dream and which is the nightmare - the choice between a vision in
which judges admit to making law and one in which they claim to be simply applying it
will depend on whether it is really possible to apply law without also making it, and
whether the law to be applied is substantively superior to what judges might have decided

12

13
14

Ibid at 747.
See Canada, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada (Ottawa: The Council, 1983) (Chairman: H.W. Arthurs).
See H.L.A. Hart, "American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and The Noble
Dream" (1977) 11Geo. L. Rev. 969 at 989.
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for themselves. Indeed, it is my view that the courts cannot do one without also doing the
other - applying the law involves choice as much as that choice involves reference to
existing law; it is a constant and organic interaction between choice and constraint,
between amendment and application, and between direction and discretion." In a manner
of speaking, judges will never get a good night's sleep (nor should they) as they are
destined to struggle with the heavy responsibilities of doing justice. The best that they can
hope for is that they will do enough good in their waking hours that they can get enough
sleep to refresh them for the next day's challenges. Judges who sleep without dreams
and/or nightmares are either so smugly confident as to question their ability to do justice
in a world in which what justice demands is always changing, or they are so anxiously
overwrought as to undermine their capacity to make difficult decisions in difficult
circumstances. Doing justice through law, if that is not oxymoronic, requires judges to
concern themselves more with the bracing light of day than the confusing shadows of
night. In this, Bastarache is correct: good judging is about much more than getting the
theory right.
Unfortunately, the whole premise of Bastarache's article persists in reinforcing the
tragically mistaken view that courts are the centre of the legal universe in that what they
do is law and what everybody else does is comment on it and suggest better ways to
catalogue and organize it. This is nicely ironic because, while claiming to take a quite
formalistic stance on law, he actually subscribes to a very realist sense of legal practice.
Throughout his essay, Bastarache emphasizes that adjudication is not an exercise in
abstract theorizing, but rather it is about dealing with particular problems in particular
circumstances. Nevertheless, Bastarache's court-centred view of the legal universe is
eagerly embraced by jurists themselves. Indeed, many legal academics can think of no
more a compliment than to be cited by the Supreme Court of Canada. And the more such
compliments the merrier. These citations are considered to be the very height of
professional achievement and are highly coveted; they are a signal honour, a notch on the
belt of academic merit, and a feather in one's scholarly cap all rolled into one. I have to
concede that I have had that dubious distinction on a couple of occasions. But I have tried
hard to resist the urge for celebration. I like to think that I attain my professional
validation and esteem in other ways. And that is the issue - what is it that academics
should be doing? How is the academic responsibility different to the judicial one? And
how can law reviews help in facilitating that role?
At bottom, the answers come down to insecurity and academics' lack of self-worth. If
academics had a better sense of themselves, they might care less what the judges thought
about them and whether their work received judicial approval. Of course, it is alright to
support a particular decision of the Supreme Court or to offer suggestions on what it
should be doing. But it is the idea that such a servile task goes to the heart of what it
means to be a serious and successful academic that is the problem. When law professors
define themselves as lackeys for their judicial superiors, they deserve no better (or worse)
treatment than such ne'er-do-wells. Academics betray the academic cause when they align
themselves so uncritically with the interests of the establishment. Instead of trying to make
1

See A.C. Hutchinson, It's All in the Game: A Non-foundationalist Account of Law and Adjudication
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000) [hereinafter "Game"].
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a silk purse out of a sow' ear, what academics should be doing is calling a spade a spade
or a pig's ear a pig's ear. Being helpmates to the judiciary is not an easy job, but it is
surely not the role of academics to work only as "constructive clerks" for the judiciary.
And, when you consider that many clerks become professors, there is much to be
concerned about. Imagine political scientists who construed their whole endeavour to be
cheerleaders for the government on the basis that one day they might become one of
them. This chilling vision is at the critical heart of Duncan Kennedy's thesis on training
for hierarchy with a vengeance.6
So what are scholars doing exactly? What are judges doing exactly? On first reading,
Bastarache seems to be very much part of the mainstream with his emphasis on the need
for order and coherence, his praise for established academics and their modus operandi,
and his presentation of the adjudicative task as a largely philosophical rather than political
undertaking. However, on a closer rereading, there are distinct and subtle hints that
Bastarache himself is not all convinced by the designated roles of academics and judges
that he forefronts. The question he raises about "whether judges simply use academic
writings and legal theories to support views they already hold or whether judges draw on
legal theory and academic writings when they make their initial decisions and form their
preliminary opinions about the nature of a case," t7 seems to be answered in a way that
suggests that rationalization, not reasoning, is the main name of the academic game. After
all, Bastarache does conclude by stating that "judges decide. Decisions are not legal
articles." 8
A number of years ago, I got very exercised about the Supreme Court's efforts to
develop a doctrine of "government action" under s. 32 of the Charter. 9 In the McKinney
case, the court did a dog's breakfast of a job in attempting to explain why hospitals and
universities were not governmental agencies (and, therefore, not subject to Charter
scrutiny) but community colleges were. 21 I tried to show that the Court was entirely lost
in a maze of its own making; there was no escape from the public-private distinction that
it hoped would resolve the law-politics distinction that plagued the courts in their
interpretation of the Charter. It was not so much that cooking up a dog's breakfast (as
opposed to some more pleasing repast) was the problem, but that a dog's breakfast was
the only possible dish that could be made from the available Charter ingredients. Still, for
many, a dog's breakfast was better than no breakfast at all, and the Court and its legions
of academic sous-chefs sought to package the resulting recipe as more nouvelle cuisine
than traditional fare. However, some traditional academics, even those who were
committed members of the Charter Lovers party, were dismayed at the Court's
performance and took seriously the criticisms of incoherence and irrationality that were
levelled at the s. 32 doctrine. But, open as they were and complimentary of the critical

16
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20

See D. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy. A Polemic Against the System

(Cambridge: Afar, 1983).
Bastarache, supra note I at 741.
Ibid. at 747.

Although I originally published the piece in the newspaper, I included it in slightly more measured
terms in A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf" A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1995) at 144-47 [hereinafter "Coraf"].
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
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work offered, they remained frustrated at my own and other critics' unwillingness to be
more constructive and less negative. A senior colleague (who is now a successful and
liberal-minded judge) simply wanted to know what was to be done - "But what should
the Court do? What can be done that is coherent and conscionable? You have only done
half the job: you need to tell the court what they should have done or else your criticisms
will not be taken seriously - you need to get in the game, not stand on the sidelines
scoffing at the poor play." I suppose that it all depends on what you think that the game
is, who are its main players, and what it means to be victorious. It is to sketching a
different sense of "useful" jurisprudence that I now turn.

While most lawyers and legal theorists are still prepared, through a combination of
intellectual naivety, institutional allegiance and political advantage, to buy into the
possible realization of jurisprudence's philosophical project or, at least, to tolerate it as
a noble undertaking, a number of critics refuse to accept such a pretence. They realize that
more is to be achieved by practical and unpretentious interventions than by grand and
arcane gestures. Indeed, rather than perpetuate popular enthraldom to the vague cause of
philosophical enlightenment, the need for there to be critical disenchantment in the name
of democratic empowerment is fully recognized. When viewed in these terms, the pressing
question of how people should live or think about law becomes not a methodological
puzzle of abstract dimensions, but a substantive challenge of historical proportions. There
is neither universal Truth nor suprahistorical Knowledge, but only the human effort to do
the best that we can with full range of human resources at our disposal. And this first
demands a switch in jurisprudential attention from the pursuit of metaphysical truth (even
the watered down Bastarachian version) to the practice of political usefulness - a juristic
account or proposal is mistaken not because it is philosophically wrong, but because it is
not practically useful. For Bastarache, "useful" is exhausted in some philosophical and
apolitical sense.
Dumping grand theory does not entail a resigned relativism in which each and every
idea or claim is as good as any other. Pragmatists take the view that all cultures are not
equal, but that all do have something to contribute to debate. Justification is a practice,
and what works will depend on the context in which justification is offered and heard. It
is not about striving to reach a promised land of truth that will make further justification
unnecessary. Instead, jurisprudence must become more useful such that success is not
vouchsafed by reliance upon a particular epistemic method, but by the usefulness of the
results arrived at and their effect upon meeting certain objectives that are taken to be
morally or politically significant: "pragmatists see the charge of relativism as simply the
charge that we see luck where our critics insist on seeing destiny."'" Pragmatists, like
Rorty, prefer hope over knowledge and insist that moral choice is always a matter of
compromise between competing goods rather than a choice between the absolutely right
and the absolutely wrong.22 Instead of reflecting upon universality to justify particular
principles, there should be talk about the concrete and relative advantages of choosing one

21
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Ibid. at xxix.
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over another in particular circumstances. There is only justification; it neither leads to nor
is it underwritten by truth, but it is to be judged by its contribution to democratic
agreement and greater emancipation. In an important sense, therefore, the alternative to
knowingness is not ignorance, but awe and wonder. And the alternative to theory is not
practicalism, but romance and politics. By seeing itself as a tool which can be used to
spark the imagination and create hope in people for the improvement of society,
jurisprudence will become more useful and relevant, not less.
In advocating a useful jurisprudence, I ought not to be taken as championing some
fixed or foundational idea of usefulness that is intended to inform and guide practice. On
the contrary, I want to ensure that this definitional effort is a integral part of the very
argumentative culture that develops and allows transformations of what is and is not
useful. This means that "[i]nstead of seeing progress as a matter of getting closer to
something specifiable in advance, [pragmatists] see it as a matter of solving more
[and it is] measured by the extent to which we have made ourselves better
problems ...
than we were in the past rather than by our increased proximity to a goal."23
Consequently, the emphasis on usefulness is not another disguised strategy of Casaubonic
theorizing in which usefulness replaces integrity or purity as the underlying standard of
jurisprudential worth. In moving from truth to usefulness, a pragmatic jurisprudence does
not set out to know things as they really are or to isolate a universal criterion of
usefulness. Because usefulness is a continually contested and contextualized yardstick, it
begs to be judged by its contribution to the ambitious project of challenging the present
arrangements in order to improve the future. To do this, jurisprudence requires a different
vocabulary more suited to its practical demands. There must be less formal talk of
integrity, consistency, and harmony and more substantive talk of justice, well-being, and
empowerment. Although pragmatism cannot answer the compelling question of what to
do next? in any fixed or certain way, it can encourage the jurisprudential effort to ensure
that valuable energies are not wasted on pseudo debates about truth and objectivity. In
doing so, it will become possible to open a space in which people can engage directly
about what is more and less useful in specific contexts at specific times.
One way to advance that useful agenda is to treat the courts and common law as venues
for the resolution of concrete disputes rather than as the site for the philosophical
elaboration of doctrinal integrity or purity. This will demand a shift in jurisprudential
emphasis from the law-making focus of judges to their problem-solving capacity. The
potential strength of the common law is its practicality and situatedness: the courts must
concentrate more on practical solutions to practical problems than on philosophical
responses to philosophical problems. In proposing this juristic realignment, I do not want
to be taken as suggesting that the common law has been or necessarily will be the perfect
complement to the kind of useful approach to jurisprudence that I have been advocating.
However, I do maintain that, when viewed from such a pragmatic perspective, the
common law has all the possibilities to become an institutional site for the kind of
experimental, contextualized, and practical interventions that I support. While the history
of the common law ought not to impress the critics' sensibilities, it does not mean that

21

R. Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Tiventieth-Century America (Cambridge:
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resort to the courts is a hopeless or counterproductive diversion. Because the present is
the only place to begin in making a better future, it is appropriate to utilize existing
institutional arrangements at the same time that one works to effect their transformation
in line with a more progressive and emancipatory ideal.24 To allow the ideal future to
be the enemy of the flawed present is a recipe for resignation and complicity, not action
and change. Ideological purity is no more attractive or useful than its philosophical
relative.
Within such a revisioning of the common law, jurists and legal scholars can play a
number of roles. Foremost among them, any study of law or ethics must not, as black
letterism proposes, be done without recognizing the political context and conditions of that
undertaking: the resilient black-letter practice of decontextualization must be strenuously
combatted. Instead, there has to be a greater recognition that law and politics are
intimately and inseparably related; it is futile and well-nigh fraudulent to study one
without the other. However, the study of politics and its relationship to law is not enough
in itself. That study must be done in such a way that avoids the pitfalls and problems of
black letterism. There is little point in examining law's political context and determinants
if it is done within the capacious reach, but narrowing influence, of a formalistic mindset.
To demand anything less is to allow the lingering spirit of black letterism to intoxicate
people into believing that clear directions and speedy routes can be mapped onto the
messy and changing terrain of ethical and political inquiry, especially in exploring the
relation of law and politics. However, as a complement (and a compliment) to the work
of such legal scholars,jurists can also play an explicitly and suitably theoretical role. They
can bring fresh insights and appreciations to jurisprudence. In particular, jurists can
develop alternative modes of discourse, so that philosophy will become more a discourse
of dissent than a monologue of reverence. Rather than draft grand schema for political or
legal action under the authority of some alleged universal truth, philosophers can seek out
new possibilities and alternative openings. By being activist in imagination and
commitment, pragmatists will come to recognize that their philosophical task is to be as
much inspired poets as robust political operatives. Or, to put it another way, jurists will
recognize that the best way to do legal philosophy is to do it pragmatically, usefully, and
poetically. The persistent belief that "law is the calling of thinkers," whether in the form
of metaphysicians or economists, and "not the place for the artist or the poet" is to be
discarded once and for all. 25 The difference between art and science or between literature
and philosophy is one of emphasis and practice, not essence and theory. In becoming
artists and poets, jurists and legal scholars can become better thinkers.

24
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For a more elaborate defence of this position and some suggestions for its implementation, see
Hutchinson, "Game," supra note 15 at 288-319 and Hutchinson, "Coraf," supra note 19 at 172-83.
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But all of this is not the same as being useful in the sense of becoming helpmates to
beleaguered judges. If law professors owe an allegiance, it is to the critical spirit of the
institutions into which they inhabit and breathe life. This is the university and world of
learning, not the relatively limited ones of law and courts. As academics, legal scholars
must be devoted to the pursuit of truth and knowledge for its own sake. If they give up
on that, they betray themselves as scholars as well as those who have fought to establish
the protected conditions in which professors are privileged to work. Of course, what
amounts to truth and knowledge is itself part of the debate that should energize
universities and law schools. And, presently, it is one of the most heated on the
intellectual agenda. However, you would not guess that if you spent your time only
reading law reviews. Unfortunately, too many legal academics play the affected role of
the naif. Occasionally, they at least have the advantage of doing so with integrity, albeit
a little too gullibly. But most of the time they are simply faking it. And, as Sam Goldwyn
might have said, once you can fake faking it, you've got it made (as anyone who saw
Meg Ryan's performance in When Harry Met Sally will surely concede). I am not sure
that I would go as far as concluding that academics are acting out of bad faith. It is more
a question of them letting what they perceive to be in their best interests get in the way
of their intellect; it is the curse of the rose-tinted spectacles. In a time-honoured ritual,
professors relate to judges like they have (or would have) their students relate to them as authoritative sources of wisdom and patronage who will repay obedience with
recognition and usefulness with promotion.
The sooner legal academics (and by implication law reviews) grasp that judges and
themselves are in different jobs, the better. Much as the impression to the contrary
suggests, law reviews are not the home of farm teams to the Big League's major
judgments. Law professors and judges are in different professions and different games.
A legal scholar who wants to be a judge is no longer a scholar; they might well be
elevated law clerks, and good ones at that, but they are not scholars. To be a scholar is
to call life's vicissitudes as you see them, not to call them because of what you would like
to see. This is not to say that scholarship that praises the court or particular decisions is
bad per se; there is room for congratulation and conservatism. But it is vital that if such
scholars want to remain true to their intellectual heritage, they must do so out of an
abundant disregard for favour. They must at least be open to the idea that they will take
the courts to task and criticize their very existence as much as the decisions that they
render. In other words, academicsmust always be willing to call it as they see it. Without
such a possibility, the legal scholar is little more than a hack who lives not for truth, but
for thanks. This is the fate of the ingrate, not the intellectual.
And how do judges repay the efforts of academicsand scholars? They treat them in the
same way that good masters treated willing servants; they patronize them and, when it
suits their immediate purpose, they put their ideas to use as packing and padding in the
judicial output. Of course, when it does not serve their purpose, they either ignore them
altogether or point out the error of their ways. Although academics like to think of'
themselves as necessary mentors to the judicial profession, they are really little more than
dispensable and occasional odd-job workers; they fix a leak here or mend a fitting there,
but they are not the indispensable resources that they pretend or want to be. As Bastarache
condescendingly puts it, "the work of academics serves to provide a contextual social
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background for legal disputes, helps to make judges aware of the underlying reasons for
the decisions that they make and offers useful suggestions for reform. No principled
approach to decision-making can ignore the contribution of academics."26

Flipping through the television channels, the Food Channel often seems to be one of
the more engaging offerings. The programs are full of pizzas and pizzazz- judges are
like the Emerils and Two Fat Ladies of the cooking world; they wear fancy outfits and
dazzle with their artful confections. Revealingly, there are no cooking academics present;
the chefs do that for themselves. The role of the food critic is much more detached and
critical; it is the chefs, by and large, who must curry favour with the critics than vice
versa. In law, the whole thing seems upside down - critics seems to crave the approval
of those that they should be criticizing. What is required is more kick-ass, less kiss-ass.
Law reviews are too much like recipe books for the privileged; they are too often satisfied
to fill their pages with lessons on how to make the perfect souffle or how to confect the
lightest hors d'oeuvre. In short, there is too much Julia Childs and not enough Urban
Peasant.
If legal scholarship proves useful to judges, so be it - that is neither good nor bad in
itself. The fact is that legal scholars should look elsewhere for their validation and
prestige. For some, citation and incorporation by the Supreme Court will be the icing on
the cake, but that is all it should be: the cake is what counts and that is being baked for
a very different clientele. In its broadest sense, scholars ought to be feeding the hunger
of society for justice. This is done not by pandering to the appetites and palates of the
established and already well-fed. It is an opportunity and responsibility to provide
substantive fare to those that are wasting away on a steady diet of coherent principles and
rational abstraction for lack of more hearty fare. Judges and legal academicsare too easily
to be found in upscale restaurants than putting in their time at local soup kitchens. Or,
more radically,judges and legal academics ought to be striving to do away with need for
soup kitchens. It simply will not do, as many legal scholars (aided and abetted by
ingratiating law reviews) seem to think in proffering their abstract accounts and logical
niceties and as many judges do in preferring logical consistency over substantive justice,
to utter the jurisprudential equivalents of Marie Antoinette's "let them eat cakes" - Let
them have coherence.
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Bastarache, supra note I at 746.

